{"id":29259,"date":"2025-05-10T14:51:21","date_gmt":"2025-05-10T11:21:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eurica.ir\/?p=29259"},"modified":"2025-08-26T11:24:56","modified_gmt":"2025-08-26T07:54:56","slug":"the-legitimacy-of-the-jcpoa-snap-back-mechanism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eurica.ir\/en\/the-legitimacy-of-the-jcpoa-snap-back-mechanism\/","title":{"rendered":"The Legitimacy of the JCPOA Snap-Back Mechanism: A Critical Analysis of E3 Compliance and Iran\u2019s Retaliatory Actions"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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\u00a0 Dr. Sasan Karimi, Adjunct professor, University of Tehran. (sasan.karimi@ut.ac.ir) International Politics Program Director, Nuclear Watch Network.<\/p>

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015, incorporates a Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM), informally known as the \u201csnap-back mechanism,\u201d to ensure compliance among its signatories. This article argues that while the E3 countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) possess the procedural capacity to trigger this mechanism, such an action would lack legitimacy. Iran\u2019s nuclear advancements since 2018, prompted by the United States\u2019 unilateral withdrawal and the E3\u2019s failure to fulfill their commitments, constitute remedial measures permitted under the JCPOA\u2019s terms. Through a detailed analysis of the JCPOA\u2019s text, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, diplomatic correspondence, and theoretical frameworks, this study demonstrates that the E3\u2019s non-compliance with their economic and diplomatic obligations undermines their legal and moral authority to invoke the snap-back mechanism. The article concludes that any attempt to do so would represent a politically motivated misuse of a legal instrument, threatening the JCPOA\u2019s credibility and the broader framework of multilateral diplomacy.<\/p>

  1. Introduction<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

    The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded on July 14, 2015, between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), and the European Union (EU), marked a pivotal moment in nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy. Negotiated over 22 months following over a decade of intermittent talks, the JCPOA sought to put more and more light on Iran\u2019s nuclear program in exchange for comprehensive sanctions relief, enabling economic reintegration into global markets. Central to the agreement\u2019s design is its reversibility, embodied in the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM), colloquially termed the \u201csnap-back mechanism,\u201d which allows for the re-imposition of the UN nuclear sanctions on Iran in response to significant non-compliance.<\/p>

    This article contends that while the E3 countries retain the \u201cmechanical ability\u201d to activate the so-called \u201csnap-back\u201d mechanism under paragraph 37 of the JCPOA, such an action would be illegitimate. Iran\u2019s post-2018 nuclear advancements, which reduced certain JCPOA commitments, were remedial responses to the United States\u2019 unilateral withdrawal in May 2018 and the E3\u2019s subsequent failure to uphold their economic and diplomatic obligations. By analyzing the JCPOA\u2019s legal framework, IAEA compliance reports, diplomatic records, and theoretical perspectives, this study demonstrates that Iran\u2019s actions align with its remedial rights under paragraph 26, while the E3\u2019s breaches undermine their standing to invoke the DRM.<\/p>

    1. The Principle of Abuse of Rights and the Namibia Precedent<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

      The principle of abuse of rights, a general principle of international law, prohibits states from exercising rights in a manner that undermines others\u2019 rights or contravenes good faith. As Lauterpacht notes, it prevents invoking rights to \u201cdefeat the object and purpose of the right or cause injury without legitimate justification\u201d (1958, p. 164). The ICJ\u2019s Namibia Advisory Opinion (1971) provides a precedent, illustrating that serious breaches of international obligations undermine a state\u2019s legitimacy to invoke legal mechanisms.<\/p>

      In the Namibia case, the ICJ addressed South Africa\u2019s illegal presence in Namibia, stating:<\/p>

      \u201cThe continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory\u201d (ICJ Reports 1971, p. 54, para. 94).\u00a0<\/p>

      South Africa\u2019s violation of UN resolutions and the right to self-determination stripped it of legitimacy to assert rights over Namibia. The Court\u2019s directive that states refrain from recognizing South Africa\u2019s authority (ibid., p. 55, para. 119) implies that using dispute settlement mechanisms to defend its presence would constitute an abuse of rights, as it would perpetuate an illegal situation. Dugard (1973) argues that South Africa\u2019s defiance \u201cplaced it in a position where it could not claim the benefits of international legal processes\u201d (p. 378).<\/p>

      This precedent applies to the JCPOA. The E3\u2019s non-compliance with economic and diplomatic commitments, akin to South Africa\u2019s breaches, undermines their standing to invoke the snap-back mechanism. Their failure to ensure Iran\u2019s economic benefits and complicity with U.S. unilateral sanctions violate the JCPOA\u2019s purpose and good faith. Invoking the DRM to penalize Iran\u2019s retaliatory measures would mirror South Africa\u2019s hypothetical misuse of legal processes, constituting an abuse of rights and violating the principle of \u201cex injuria jus non oritur\u201d[1]<\/a>.<\/p>

      1. Historical Context of the JCPOA<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

        The JCPOA emerged from a complex historical backdrop of mistrust and diplomatic tensions between Iran and Western powers. The Iran-Iraq War (1980\u20131988), Western support for Iraq, and before that the U.S. hostage crisis had entrenched mutual suspicion. Iran\u2019s nuclear program, initiated in the 1950s under the U.S.-backed Atoms for Peace program, became a \u201cflashpoint\u201d in the early 2000s. This led to UN Security Council sanctions from 2006 to 2010, complemented by unilateral U.S. and EU restrictive measures, which imposed pressures on Iran\u2019s economy, reducing oil exports and restricting financial transactions.<\/p>

        Negotiations between 2003 and 2013 were marked by intermittent progress and setbacks. Iran viewed its nuclear program as a sovereign right under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while Western powers sought to prevent potential \u201cweaponization\u201d. The election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013, coupled with a shift in U.S. policy under President Barack Obama, created a window for intensive negotiations from 2013 to 2015. The JCPOA balanced Iran\u2019s nuclear constraints\u2014such as time-framed limiting uranium enrichment and reducing centrifuge numbers\u2014with economic incentives, including sanctions relief in trade, finance, and energy.<\/p>

        The agreement\u2019s mutual reversibility was a response to decades of mistrust. Both sides sought guarantees against non-compliance, leading to the inclusion of the DRM. However, the JCPOA\u2019s status as a political agreement, rather than a legally binding treaty, was because of the mentioned agreed mutual reversibility. The U.S. withdrawal in 2018 under President Donald Trump, who re-imposed sanctions under a \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d campaign, placing the burden of compliance on the remaining parties, particularly the E3.<\/p>

        1. The JCPOA\u2019s Reversibility Framework<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

          The JCPOA is predicated on reciprocity and reversibility, ensuring compliance is contingent on mutual performance. The DRM, outlined in paragraph 37, formalizes this reversibility:<\/p>

          \u201cUpon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>

          This mechanism allows any participant to initiate a process that could reinstate UN Security Council sanctions if a party, which logically could be Iran, is deemed non-compliant. The snap-back mechanism serves as a deterrent, incentivizing adherence by threatening the reversal of sanctions relief on Iran. Its legitimacy, however, depends on the invoking party\u2019s compliance, as retaliatory actions by a non-breaching party cannot constitute an initial breach.<\/p>

          The JCPOA assumes a sequential logic: a breach by one party triggers counter-measures, potentially culminating in the DRM\u2019s activation. Simultaneous breaches are rare and complicate identifying the initial violator. In the JCPOA\u2019s case, the sequence is clear: the U.S. withdrawal in May 2018, followed by the re-imposition of sanctions specified in Annex II, marked the first significant violation. Iran maintained full compliance for another full year, as verified by several IAEA reports[2]<\/a>, before starting its reactional remedial measures in May 2019. This temporal gap underscores that Iran\u2019s actions were responsive, aligning with the JCPOA\u2019s provisions for retaliation.<\/p>

          From a legal perspective, the DRM reflects principles of international contract law, particularly the concept of material breach under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). A material breach entitles others to suspend performance, provided the response is proportionate. Iran\u2019s phased reduction of commitments\u2014such as increasing uranium enrichment to 20% and expanding centrifuge operations\u2014was framed as reversible, gradual and proportionate, reinforcing its adherence to the JCPOA\u2019s legal framework. This legal grounding strengthens Iran\u2019s position as a retaliating, rather than violating, party.<\/p>

          1. Iran\u2019s <\/strong>Remedial <\/strong>Rights Under the JCPOA<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

            The JCPOA explicitly grants Iran the right to retaliate in response to breaches, particularly regarding sanctions relief. Paragraph #26 states:<\/p>

            \u201cThe EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>

            As Iran fulfilled its commitments altogether on the implementation day, 16th<\/sup> January 2016, this provision establishes two key principles. First, it obligates the EU and the U.S. to refrain from re-imposing sanctions, ensuring Iran\u2019s economic benefits. Second, it permits Iran to suspend its (JCPOA-based) nuclear commitments if sanctions are re-imposed, framing such actions as retaliatory. Iran\u2019s decision to scale back on its commitments starting in May 2019\u2014exactly one year after the U.S. withdrawal\u2014was consistent with this clause.<\/p>

            The U.S. withdrawal rendered it a non-participant, leaving the E3, China, Russia, and the EU to uphold the agreement. Iran\u2019s retaliatory measures, including expanding centrifuge operations and increasing enrichment levels, were framed as reversible steps within the JCPOA\u2019s framework, signaling its intent to remain engaged while pressuring others to fulfill their obligations. This strategic approach contrasts with the U.S.\u2019s outright abandonment, highlighting Iran\u2019s good faith and adherence to the agreement\u2019s legal structure. Iran\u2019s restraint in calibrating its responses further underscores its commitment to the JCPOA\u2019s framework.<\/p>

            1. The E3\u2019s Non-Compliance with JCPOA Obligations<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>

              The E3\u2019s failure to uphold their commitments, particularly after the U.S. withdrawal, constitutes a significant violation that undermines their legitimacy to invoke the snap-back mechanism. The JCPOA emphasizes Iran\u2019s economic benefits as a core incentive. Paragraph viii of the Preamble states:<\/p>

              \u201cThis JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran\u2019s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>

              Annex II details the sanctions to be lifted, covering financial and banking measures (section 4.1), trade in goods and services (section 4.6), civil aviation (section 4.8.1), and imports of Iranian-origin goods (section 4.8.2). Paragraph 24 of Annex II underscores the EU\u2019s commitment to comprehensively lift nuclear-related sanctions, while paragraphs 25 and 27 emphasize the obligation to ensure Iran\u2019s economic benefits. Paragraph 28 states:<\/p>

              \u201cThe EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>

              Despite these obligations, the E3 failed to deliver the promised economic dividends. Their non-compliance can be categorized as follows:<\/p>