milestone in their bilateral relations. The two states recognise each other as indispensable powers and are contributing to tackling mutual threats arising from the international order, which they believe needs revision. Indeed, a security convergence has emerged between the two states in which shared threat perceptions are forming, longerterm cooperation between military and security agencies is being institutionalised and common security goals pursued. Despite various analyses of the extent of IranianRussian rapprochement, questions still remain about its fundamental elements and its sustainability in the face of the conflicting interests of the two countries. Strategic implications of continued Iranian-Russian security cooperation in the Middle East make it essential to draw an analytical framework that goes beyond shallow levels of shared interests or disagreements in order to illustrate the pillars supporting security convergence and their interactions with the existing limitations of bilateral relations.
Economic factors fail to explain the nature of current Iranian-Russian relations as trade barely exceeds USD 2 billion (Mosavian 2017). The fate of joint economic investment projects, including in the oil and gas sectors, and mutual efforts to tackle US sanctions, are still uncertain and most remain on paper only. Meanwhile, previous efforts to boost trade, such as promoting national currencies for bilateral trade or the International North-South Transport Corridor Project (INSTC), were almost failures. On the social level, there is no major indication of grassroots efforts or broad cultural ties to bring societies closer. Historical memories of Russo-Persian wars (1804-13 and 1826-28) in which Iran suffered huge territorial losses are still vivid in Iranians’ minds and prevent social rapprochement. Even initiatives like the visa waiver agreement to promote social and cultural ties have not yet been operationalised. On the contrary, the relationship between the two countries is dominated by cooperation at the state level, where security is the top priority driving other aspects of bilateral cooperation.
Historically, Iran and Russia’s military-technical cooperation dates back to 1967 when Iran was considered a regional ally of the United States. Iranians signed two arms deals with the Soviets in 1967 and 1976 worth USD 705 million, intended to defuse the Soviet threat and pressure the US for more arms sales to Iran (Divsallar and Arjmand 2019). Yet, this limited cooperation was hardly of any military significance as the Iranian armed forces were heavily dependent on the US. On the regional level, the implications were also few due to Iran’s semi-independent foreign policy. Postrevolutionary security cooperation experienced its peak during the early 1990s when Russia sold large amounts of military hardware, including fighter jets, submarines and armoured vehicles to Tehran. Russian military-technical assistance continued with delivery of S-300 along with low profile attempts to strengthen Iran’s early warning capacities. However, recent security cooperation goes well beyond arms transfers and embraces new aspects that make it distinctive from previous experiences.
First, it incorporates extensive bilateral intelligence-sharing in the framework of antiISIS cooperation (Shamkahni 2017). Second, it includes coordinated military operations which are an absolutely new element in bilateral relations. Military operational coordination at the command and control level in Iraq (Farsnews 2017), and joint tactical operations in Syria with Iranian boots on the ground and Russian air support are examples of the extent of operational coordination. And third, security cooperation has helped Moscow and Tehran pursue their broader strategic goals, that is to mould the regional security architecture and achieve global power status. The Astana Accord, which shows the capacity of the two countries, along with Turkey, to advance their preferred regional order and limit the US military presence, has helped them boost their efforts in shaping the regional security order and moving on to more complex phases like stability operations.
These characteristics reveal a progressive security convergence between Iran and Russia which, albeit with various limits, has been a success in overcoming historical mistrust, old rivalries and differences. However, there are serious questions regarding the objectives of this cooperation and particularly the pillars on which it has been built. This article introduces ‘international misrecognition’ and ‘common threat perceptions’ as the two main pillars of security convergence. These pillars and the nexus between them explain how the two countries have a shared understanding of the security environment; particularly how their mutual sense of insecurity has taken the lead in forging bilateral relations. Indeed, the article argues that the quest for power is insufficient for explaining the ultimate reasons behind current cooperation. It is true that security convergence is a power strategy, but its main function is to provide more protection to the states, both of which feel threatened and insecure.
The pillar of international misrecognition
The pillar of international misrecognition Self-image, the problem of thick misrecognition, and mutual recognition are the three components of the first pillar. These elements bring the two countries’ understandings of the security environment closer together by referring to historical and civilizational aspects as the basis for defining their position on the global stage. These are perceptions at the cognitive level which are rooted in intellectual and strategic factors and usually enjoy strong public support, making them a powerful part of their current political rationality. Moreover, the first pillar has been influenced significantly by the rise of identity politics in both countries.
Shared self-image
Self-image is an important element in a country’s belief system and builds a strategic context for foreign policy decisions (Levy 2013). The importance of self-image in the Iranian and Russian cases is due to its significant power in defining their international roles. Both Iran and Russia consider themselves great civilizations with unique histories, cultures, values, resources and identities. Both see a great role for their civilizations in building Middle Eastern and Eurasian culture and identity. The ‘Persian World’ for Iranians and the ‘Russian World’ for Russians are concepts that refer to a civilizational approach and lead to defining self-image. History contributes considerably to these nations’ modernisation paths (Tazmini 2018) and subsequently their current understandings of global issues as it resonates an indispensable power image. Hence the civilizational approach is influencing current political rationality.
Iran is seen as having a cultural and intellectual heritage with territorial power that has been able to sustain itself throughout history (Ardakani 2017). The fact that the Persian Empire was one of the ancient civilizations with great cultural influence from the Mediterranean to Central Asia is still powerful in defining self-image and identity among Iranians (Kaplan 2015). The so-called “new Islamic civilization”, as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls it, is another effort to revive past glories in conjunction with Islamic values. This new Islamic civilization gives Iranians a global spiritual mission that is in accordance with their cultural heritage, and more realistic than idealistic revolutionary rhetoric. It positions Iran at the centre of this new civilization, which is conceived as a natural great power in the Middle East. This Iran-centric conception leads to an awareness of the country’s role in the region based on Iran’s unique identity andhistorical power (Lotfian 2011).
Such self-image is also echoed in foreign policy. Proponents of civilizational approaches in Iran argue that the share of major civilizations in creating the globalorder has to be reassessed as they promote peaceful coexistence (Saghafi 1996). The large territories influenced by Persian culture, values and history stretch far beyond the Islamic Republic’s borders, creating an area of cultural influence that is still felt today. The cultural identity directly linked to the history of the Persian civilization, coupled with Persian contributions to nourishing Islam are definitive elements in Iranians’ selfimage today.
Rather the same is true for the Russian self-image, but in a different context. Russia is a great nation with a rich history, which traditionally ruled a large area in Eurasia and contributed much to global peace and order. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly emphasizes Russia’s history as a pivotal power which plays a great role in European security and managing the global order (Lavrov 2016). The historical and civilizational approach is gaining even more importance in Russia’s foreign policy orientation lately and is believed will continue in President Vladimir Putin’s fourth term in office.
A recent conservative turn in Russian politics is associated with the return to the cultural and political ideologies of messianism (Engstrom 2014, 356), such as the theological concept of Katechon, which is directly linked to a civilizational approach. As Zevelev (2015, 3) argues, the Russian self-image is based on two critical ideas. One is that of Russia as a strong and independent great power, a stronghold for all ‘conservative’ forces that oppose revolutions, chaos and liberal ideas imposed by the US and Europe; and the other is the existence of a greater Russian World (Russkiy mir) that transcends Russia’s state borders and implies a civilization that differs from that of the West.
Thus, Russia and Iran are similar in their perception of ‘self’, characterised by their distinct, unique civilizations and identities, and their great cultural influence beyond their borders. For example, recent polls have revealed that support among the Russian elite for extending national interests beyond Russia’s current territories has grown to 82 percent (Rivera et al. 2016, 15). In both countries, the historical and civilizational approach is gaining support and making the search for dignity a major foreign policy mission. Both countries envision regional or global missions for themselves originating in a mix of nationalistic-ideological roots: the new Islamic civilization in the Iranian case and the Katechom messianic ideology in the Russian case. In other words, selfimage involves a right inherited from history to assert power in peripheries to protect their respective identities. This historical right to assert power has now turned into an indispensable part of their political rationality and any opposition to it can be seen as a security threat.
Thick recognition
Thick recognition refers to profound identity features and underlines particularistic features of identity (Strombom 2014, 171). As Alexander Wendt (2003) argues, it involves having respect for the features that make the subject (identity) unique and understanding for other fundamental features of identity. The conception of misrecognition is relative, since it is in accordance with each country’s self-image and the level of respect it feels it deserves. Both Russia and Iran feel their unique culture and civilization have not been recognized on the world stage, and are under constant attack. In other words, they share the same problem of thick misrecognition by the international order. In addition, misrecognition in the Iranian and Russian cases is even stronger, as both are trying to prove their power and influence throughout their respective spheres of influence as a right which should to be recognized. Therefore the problem of misrecognition for Iran and Russia has two main dimensions: misrecognition of their unique identity and misrecognition of their right to exert power on that basis.
The feeling of being mistreated and misrecognized is deeper when it comes to security issues and particularly Iran’s role in the regional order. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could be interpreted as an example of Iranian efforts to receive international recognition of their policies and rights (Maleki 2017; Dehshiri 2017). Indeed, this was part of an argument employed by proponents of the JCPOA in their hot debates against hardline critiques during 2015 and 2016. Polls showed a high rate of public support for this aspect of Iranian nuclear negotiations. Iran’s desire to legitimize its role and participation in solving regional challenges as an ancient civilization which enjoys a long inspirational history was widely expressed, as by Foreign Minister Mohamad Javad Zarif (2017) in his speech to the Ancient Civilizations Forum. Even Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei considers Iranian responsibility toward global and regional issues a principle of his foreign policy agenda (Velayati 2008). Thus, thick recognition is a prominent factor in forging Iran’s perception of order. “Iran as a responsible power” is not yet receiving satisfactory recognition internationally and is even being pictured in an opposite manner through Iranophobia projects; “Iran as a responsible power” is not a revolutionary or ideological concept, but rather an offshoot of Iran’s political rationality based on its perception of self.
The same applies to Russia, but with a broader global scope. Yet, the self-image and international recognition hardly match. Recognizing Russia as an equal partner without which Washington cannot make major international decisions (Borshchevskaya 2017b) is in harmony with Russia’s self-image, but far from reality. After some progress in bilateral relations with the US, by 2017 Putin had grown deeply disenchanted and came to feel that the West was treating Russia as a “vassal”; he became convinced that, no matter how accommodating he might be, Western powers had an innate disinclination to treat Russia as a full partner and a respected member of the international order (Osnos 2017). The comments of US President Barack Obama (2014) calling Russia a regional power that was threatening some of its immediate neighbours not out of strength but out of weakness was clearly a reinforcing sign for the Kremlin that thick misrecognition was a true problem.
Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was among the first to mention the problem, asserting that the West had taken advantage of Russia’s weakness and that its policies were marked by a clear disrespect for Russia (Hill and Gaddy 2015, 36). The problem of Russia’s thick misrecognition is even addressed by leading US think tanks as an element leading to its divergence from the West after a period of pro-Western policies during the 1990s and early 2000s (Radin and Reach 2017, 23-29).
The same feeling emerged in Tehran after US-Iran cooperation on Afghanistan and former President Mohammad Khatami’s moderate rapprochement toward the West signalling Iran’s green light to a new start in relations resulted in no more than US President George W. Bush’s speech on the ‘axis of evil’. Later, Tehran’s proposal expressing its willingness to negotiate on a comprehensive range of issues was dismissed by the Bush administration and reinforced Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception that Tehran could do nothing to pacify Washington, short of effectively ceding its sovereignty (Buonomo 2018, 39). Trump’s decision to tear up the JCPOA and his advocacy of regime change is fuelling more than ever a sense of misrecognition and disrespect for Iran’s sovereignty, security concerns and interests among the Iranian elite and policymakers.
Mutual recognition
Faced with the same problem of international misrecognition, Iran and Russia have bilaterally recognized each other as indispensable powers. Since Russia’s effort in the Middle East seems designed to balance against the US (Alterman 2017), while respecting Iranian regional power status, it has been accepted as a legitimate external balancing power in the Middle East and receives high praise and recognition in Tehran. During Putin’s meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei in November 2017, the Iranian leader endorsed Putin as a man of action and decision and called Russia a major power with which Iran seeks cooperation in order to carry out great deeds (Khamenei 2017). This was a clear message to the Russian leadership that Iran not only understands its northern neighbour’s global status, but also perceives its policies as a constructive power projection in the Middle East.
Likewise, Russia sees Iran as a strongman in Western Asia. Russians are traditionally attracted by the notion of strongman and Iran definitely fits the bill. In the last decades, Iran has emerged as the most stable country in the region, being able to contain political uprisings like the Green Movement in 2009 and social unrest in early 2018; as well as resisting global sanctions, and US regime change policies and military threats – all the while advancing its regional power and influence. When Putin highlights Iran’s role as a “trustworthy and reliable ally” (Borshchevskaya 2017a), it is mainly because he considers Iran a powerful player in his Middle East policy which can be relied on for achieving Russia’s regional and global security goals. On the whole, Russia’s position in recognizing Iran’s power can be viewed as pragmatic, but it also provides the thick recognition Iranians are looking for. The bilateral recognition that the two countries offer each other facilitates turning the problem of international misrecognition into a common problem.
The pillar of common threat perceptions
The natural result of being misrecognized by the international order, for countries which see themselves as cultural civilizations with regional or global power, is a deep sense of insecurity and threat to their identity. Indeed, threat perceptions have been transformed into the core principle of strategic logic behind Iran’s security policies, including its regional behaviour and power projection (Divsallar 2018, 41). Russia is doing the same. It is interesting that, more than ever throughout their contemporary history, Iran and Russia are now finding common threats. Both countries see their identity and stability as focal points threatened by the international order. Threats to their identity touch on core constructs which in the Iranian case is the Islamic-Iranian identity and in the Russian case the conservative-messianic identity. On the other hand, threats to their stability such as regime change policies and sanctions are at the top of their national security issues along with societal discontents, radical jihadist groups and military threats. Neither Russia nor Iran have any other state with which to share such broad and fundamental strategic threats. These shared aspects of threat perception are what makes Iranian-Russian security convergence possible and enduring as long as the source of threats remains intact. Although a number of differences appear when it comes to regional threat perceptions, there are still common issues like NATO and the US military build-up in the Middle East.
Growing identity threats
Iran’s Islamic-Iranian identity was specifically mentioned as a state priority in the sixth five-year Development Plan (2017-21). Articles 72 and 73 of this plan set out legally binding directives to respond to any soft threats against Iran’s Islamic-Iranian identity. Even if identity threats were acknowledged by the founder of the Iranian Revolution, Imam Khomeini, during the 1980s (for more on this, see Khomeini 2010), it was not until the Ayatollah Khamenei era that they became the centre of gravity of Iran’s threat perceptions. He has repeatedly insisted on identity threats and cultural invasions as the main aspects of the threats to Iran, believing that the West wants Iranians to abandon their faith, values, and Islamic principles and reverse independent national identity (Khamenei 2004). Meanwhile, there is a rather strong consensus among ruling clerics that Western identity-based threats are aimed at destroying Iran’s revolutionary discourse. Some even see economic pressures as a tool to weaken the regime’s identity base.
A recent study on Iranian leaders’ threat perceptions reveals that the identity threat is understood in their discourses as secularization; Vaticanization – the separation of politics from religion; Balkanization – sectarian movements; and Andalusization – corruption and depravity (Ahmadian 2015, 28-30). A deeper look at Iranian cultural policies shows that these policies are mostly reactionary rather than expansionary (Larijani 2016), as Iranians feel they are under attack from Western culture and even Sunni-dominated countries, whereby core cultural constructs defining their unique identity are at risk. It is an enduring belief among the political elite that the West is pursuing cultural hegemony by neglecting cultural differences and promoting its way of life. It is believed that the harsher Trump policy of regime change and JCPOA withdrawal is intended to abolish Iranian territorial integrity and dismantle Iran’s cultural and soft power.
The interesting point is that Russians are also reaching the same conclusions. The Russian 2008 foreign policy concept acknowledged the threat of civilizational competition and asserted that “for the first time in contemporary history, global competition is acquiring civilizational dimensions which suggests competition between different value systems” (Kremlin 2008). Later this competition took on a more threatening nature and was seen as a clear threat. Russia’s conflicts in its ‘near abroad’, with the Georgian and Ukrainian ‘pivots to the West’, had serious repercussions on the Kremlin’s threat perceptions. The increased frequency of the terms “morality” and “spiritual” in Putin’s speeches since his return to the presidency in 2012 shows that the cultural threat is seen as a serious issue that needs to be addressed (Laruelle 2015, 21). Generally, Western policies are seen as attempts to deny Russia’s distinct identity and historic mission (Zevelev 2016). In response, securitization of identity has followed. Hence, both Iran and Russia share a sense of perceived Western cultural and civilizational encirclement.
Long-term threats to stability
The other aspect of Iranian-Russian common threat perceptions is seen in the way they formulate threats to their stability. External regime change, sanctions and radical jihadi groups like the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are the three top common threats in this category.
Regime change involves a vast array of covert and espionage operations as well as feeding internal opposition and social discontent. Both countries feel threatened by regime change and see it as one of the main aspects of security cooperation. While Iran has long been faced with open threats of direct regime change as a rather permanent feature of US policy9, in the Russian case, it was formerly more on a covert basis. However, the Arab Spring uprisings, especially in Egypt, Libya and Syria have been lumped together with other colour revolutions in post-Soviet Eurasia in a way that has further internationalized and generalized Russia’s aversion to such developments anywhere (Stepanova 2016, 26). Both countries feel threatened by Western powers’ institutionalization of forceful regime change in the international order as a legitimate mechanism to shape the security order.10 They are therefore both firmly committed to opposing it, and have been able to rely on each other in doing so (Geranmayeh and Liik 2016).
Sanctions are another common threat to stability as they block economic development and pave the way for social unrest. There is a clear link between sanctions and regime change as the former lead to social discontent and political violence, hence leaving the regime dysfunctional in fulfilling its responsibilities. These aspects of sanctions represent an existential threat to Tehran and Moscow. Iran has been subject to unparalleled sanctions since 1979. The rising social discontent in Iran manifested during the December 2017-January 2018 protests which also continued afterward shows how sanctions have economic costs that can lead to political instability. The deteriorating economic situation and its effects on the redistribution of wealth is a direct threat to the political regime. In this respect, Iranian officials have repeatedly called US policy an economic war (Jahangiri 2018).
Russia finds itself in a similar situation – albeit of less intensity – where sanctions are affecting internal stability. In spite of the Kremlin’s claims that sanctions are having minimal effects on the economy, they are playing an important role in fuelling dissatisfaction. With fewer carrots to distribute, the Kremlin is forced to pass unpopular social measures and must coerce the elites to ensure their loyalty, which will in the end harm the regime’s stability (Snegovaya 2018). Mehdi Sanaei (2017), Iranian ambassador to Moscow, calls the unjust Western sanctions against Russia and Iran a common threat to both which encourages them to cooperate more closely and formulate joint measures. Radical jihadi groups like ISIS have been the most important threat to internal stability igniting deeper security cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in Syria. Iran has been struggling with radical Sunni insurgents responsible for the deaths of dozens of Iranian soldiers, policemen and civilians in Sistan-Baluchistan (Czulda 2016, 94) and Kerman Provinces for years. However, threats from radical jihadists became more serious after August 2014 when ISIS’ advance into Iraqi cities led to the takeover of Jalula, a citylocated just 50 km from the Iranian border. As highlighted by one Iranian military official, only 60 percent of Iran’s borders are totally blocked and secured (Rezaei 2018), while Iran is surrounded by a number of terrorist organizations, from ISIS and the Kurdish Democratic Party on its western borders, to Jeish-ol-Adl, Jundallah and the Taliban on its eastern borders. These groups conduct regular attacks along Iran’s borders with Pakistan and Iraqi Kurdistan. The fear of ISIS infiltration into the underdeveloped Iranian provinces close to the borders which have Sunni populations is Tehran’s nightmare. The 2017 terror attack in Tehran, the beheading of an Iranian officer in Syria in August 2017, possible ISIS involvement in the 2018 terror attack on the military parade in Ahwaz and February 2019 attack on an IRGC bus in southeast Iran have revealed the imminent risk of Islamic extremism to the Iranian mainland. Indeed, these groups were formally included in Iran’s security threat list in 2014.
ISIS’ threat to Russia has mounted since the 2015 bombing of the Russian passenger airliner over Egypt, and with the fragile security situation in central Asia and the possibility of jihadists returning to Russia from Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the growth of Wahhabi extremism in the northern Caucasus has been Moscow’s main internal threat for years. Experts expect further security challenges as the demography of Muslim communities changes. Both Tehran and Moscow believe that radicalized ethnic and religious movements in common areas between the two countries can jeopardize their interests (Karami 2016, 25). The spread of ISIS and other extremist groups which are both anti-Shiite and anti-Russian in central Asia and Afghanistan is a major common threat to internal stability.
Overlapping regional threats
NATO’s expansion to the east and the US military build-up in the Middle East and Central Asia are also considered two major common regional threats. In this regard, while Russia’s deep-seated feeling of insecurity toward NATO has a long history and NATO-Russia tensions over NATO’s eastern expansion are nothing new, NATO’s implicit threat to Iran is a rather recent factor (Rumer 2016, 18). Although NATO is not an imminent threat to Iran, its military build-up and aggressive rhetoric in the absence of direct dialogue are pushing Tehran closer to Moscow when it comes to threat perceptions.
NATO perceptions of threat from Iran first appeared in the 2010 Lisbon Summit Report of the Group of Experts, NATO’s New Strategic Concept, and have since then been cited as its main policy. NATO’s military mechanism has made foreign and defence policymakers in Tehran unanimously agree that NATO’s presence in Iran’s periphery is a threat to its security (Kiani 2016, 74). Tehran perceives NATO’s expansion to the east, which may in the future eventually include Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the deployment of elements of missile defence in the Persian Gulf, as a policy to reinforce US-led global hegemony.
At the same time, Iran’s opposition to the US military presence in the Middle East and Central Asia goes back to early 1980s and has, since then, remained a key regional policy. Iran perceives US military deployments and engagements in the Middle East as a part of a larger plan to shape the regional security architecture which guarantees US interests. Indeed, Iran feels encircled by US military bases located in nearly all its neighbourhood with the exception of Armenia. In total, there are 422 military airports collectively possessing approximately 2500 m of runway in a radius of 2800 km around Iran (Barzegar and Rezaei 2017, 30). These bases were considered direct military threats by the Iranian military in 2007-08 when intelligence reports showed the possibility of a US strike. Back then, Iran’s military took concrete measures to retaliate against US bases as part of its revised deterrent doctrine.
Russians, however, are not pursuing the same goal as Iranians to push Americans out of the region, as there is no direct military threat to Russia via their bases. Nevertheless, the continued US military presence in the Middle East and Caucasus is among their top security challenges as they also believe that these bases are part of the US’ strategic global power projection to implement the US-led order. As argued by Ayatollah Khamenei in his meeting with President Putin in November 2017, the US presence in the Middle East is a common threat to both as its long-term plan is against the interests of the two nations but can only be thwarted by closer cooperation (Khamenei 2017).
Limits of convergence
There are however substantial limits to Iran-Russia security convergence which put certain boundaries on and restrain the depth of cooperation. In fact, the sustainability and the long-term success of convergence depends on the interaction of these limits with the aforementioned pillars. Until now the security convergence has proved to be advantageous for both sides and thus has overcome most of the limits, but it is unclear if this trend can be sustained in the long run. The power of the limits depends broadly on whether the security convergence is successful in defusing the threats and helps Moscow and Tehran gain international recognition. Effective security convergence is probably less vulnerable to the limits. There are at least three sets of issues that limit security convergence: limits from competing intellectual views on bilateral relations, limits rooted in different power strategies, and limits resulting from natural rivalries.
In both capitals there are competing intellectual views over the depth and form of bilateral relations. An intellectual divide about the role of Iran in Russian foreign policy exists among the various Russian political schools of thought. While the Russian nationalists and supporters of Euro-Atlantic approaches share little desire for a permanent geopolitical marriage with Iran and are pragmatically sceptical in their vision of Iran, the Eurasian intellectuals regard Iran as Russia’s foremost ally and not just a counterbalance to the West in general but as a way to help Russia achieve great power status once again (Shalpentokh 2009). More pragmatist intellectuals may also suggest using the Iranian card to pressure the West. Likewise, in Tehran, political elites are divided over the Russian issue. Reformist and pro-Western intellectuals provide only minimum support for any sort of inclusive alliance with Moscow and are in favour of tactical relations that would not be seen as an obstacle to building relations with the West. By contrast, hardliner intellectuals close to the military establishments fully support the expansion of ties with Russia. Lack of consensus and diverse understandings among intellectuals create limits for policymakers in the two countries. In particular, they make it difficult to work out a longer-term framework for cooperation that could eventually put an end to historical mistrust.
Another set of limits are rooted in the fact that Iran and Russia are internationally positioned at two different levels of power; consequently, their power strategies have major rifts. While Iran seeks to secure its position as an indispensable regional power, Moscow is struggling for great power status. The power inequality makes joint efforts for international recognition challenging. For example, Moscow’s preferred regional strategy in the Middle East is based on a balance between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and Turkey. If successful, Russia could increase its international reputation as an agile and effective balancing power. However, the role requires that Moscow keep its connections with all major regional players, including Iran’s main adversaries, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Essentially Russian pragmatism and political realism is characterized by treating no one wholly as an ally or wholly as an adversary (Trenin 2018, 21). In fact, it is against Russia’s balancing strategy to highlight Iran as a strategic ally among other regional powers. Such a realpolitik requirement is well understood in Tehran, but nevertheless raises suspicion about Moscow possibly negotiating Iranian interests in order to keep its regional balancing strategy functioning. While Iran generally supports Moscow’s balancing strategy, it perceives some of its aspects as a fundamental limit to its regional power. This could certainly be a limit to Iran-Russia security convergence as well.
The final set of limits arises from the prospects for rivalry between Iran and Russia, either culturally in the South Caucasus and Central Asia or economically on energy markets. It is interesting that the broader Persian and Russian worlds are already interfering with each other in countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and even Turkmenistan, and this could be the source of tensions. In addition to active Iranian cultural and religious policies in the post-Soviet South Caucasus (Kamrava 2017) and Central Asia, Iran enjoys historical cultural ties with these states, including ethnic and family ties, common language, and religious influences. It is true that Russians have not yet been threatened by Iran’s cultural presence in these areas but, along with Turkey, Iran and Russia keep up a muted competition in their interwoven spheres of influence.
Yet, economic rivalries, particularly in oil and gas exports and transit routes, are the most notable long-term issues that could cause tension. Both countries are seeking to initiate or increase their oil and gas exports to Europe and see each other as potential rivals. Upon the lifting of sanctions, Iran had already started negotiations to penetrate the European natural gas market, as both a supplier and a transit country, which was taken as a threat by Russia (Kalehsar and Telli 2017). Tehran will need the Black Sea ports in Georgia and has expressed its willingness to use the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines, but Moscow has successfully obstructed all Iranian attempts to establish independent pipelines and railways to Armenia and Georgia (Avdaliani 2018). Although Iran is facing major investment and technology deficits for increasing gas productions due to US sanctions and Europe’s cautious policy, the energy sector remains the most serious sector for competition and rivalry between Iran and Russia.
Conclusion: toward security convergence
Iran’s political rationality pushes for a balance between available power resources and strategic limitations (Barzegar and Divsallar 2017). Security convergence with Russia is an integral part of this political rationality, since it is rooted in the growing belief that Iran cannot respond to its threats and gain international recognition alone because of an increasing array of limitations. This is a clear distancing from the early revolutionary slogan of ‘No East, No West’, when strategic calculations were secondary to revolutionary rhetoric. On the other hand, Russia needs strong regional partners to overcome its strategic deficits. For the Russians, the security convergence with Iran is advantageous as it could expand their capacity to deal with threats and obtain thick recognition. Indeed, the security convergence is a joint power maximization policy designed to make use of the complementary resources of the two sides to respond to the common problems of international misrecognition and security threats.
The security convergence between Tehran and Moscow is based on a shared understanding of the international order as an unjust environment that not only does not recognize Iran’s and Russia’s unique civilizational identities but actually puts them at risk. The two states are not receiving recognition in accordance with their self-image. This forms the first pillar of convergence. The second pillar is based on a mixture of common civilizational, internal, and regional threats. Issues like sanctions, regime change, Islamic extremism, NATO expansion to the east and the US military presence in the Middle East are seen in both capitals as common threats. In reality, the first pillar of misrecognition could also contribute to threat perceptions, since it puts the core constructs of identity in danger and inevitably generates new forms of identity threats. The formation of these pillars should be seen in light of the deep sense of insecurity and hence securitization of identity in both capitals. Hence, it could be argued that threat-based approaches can explain Iranian and Russian rapprochement better than interest-based approaches.
These threats are perceived to originate either directly or indirectly in the established international order. As long as Tehran and Moscow are simultaneously faced with international misrecognition and feel insecure regarding common threats, existing limits in bilateral relations rooted in mistrust, disagreements and rivalries will not have significant effects on the fate of the convergence. Leaders on both sides have shown that they are willing to close an eye to their differences in order to be able to work on more vital security issues, such as the Middle East security order, that facilitate acquiring international recognition and defusing common threats. The pillars explain why various disagreements ranging from different views in conducting operations in Syria and rifts over the future of Bashar al-Assad to conflicting positions on oil policies and Iran’s aggressive stand against Israel have not yet been able to pose serious challenges to the security convergence. In addition, the strategic security environment makes for stronger security ties between Iran and Russia. Considering the tough European and US positions against both Russia and Iran, the pillars of security convergence remain stable, promising continued security cooperation between the two.
The International Spectator
Italian Journal of International Affairs 2019
